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Base Erosion and Profit Shifting in Continental Africa and Beyond, a Comparative 
Analysis 
Abstract 
Base erosion and profit shifting has become the latest burden on countries’ tax 
revenue collection agencies the world over.  Recent studies have found how it occurs in 
the both the developed and developing world, but these same studies haven’t answered 
the question of why in the developing world.  This thesis tries to answer that question 
concerning Africa, which is a continent full of developing nations.  Using Base Erosion, 
Profit Shifting, and Developing Countries (Crivelli et. al, 2015) which outlines how the 
international economy is interconnected through a tax base spillover estimation, this 
paper turns its attention towards the developing nations of Africa.  The analysis of the 
data collected showed trends towards increased base spillover in not simply African 
nations, but those which are simply more fragile in nature.  This implies that resources 
should be used to bring fragile nations into the fold of sustainable countries where lost 
tax base revenues are minimized.  Applying fixed effects regressions on a country-level 
panel dataset spanning 30 years (1990-2020) to explore the relationship between 
corruption and base spillover - the country level measurement of corporate tax avoidance, 
we find that corruption has a significant and negative impact on a country's tax base, and 
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I.  Introduction 
 Corporate tax avoidance has long been a practice in the Western world, taking on 
many forms.  In recent years there has been an increase in its incidence rate.  From this 
has come a greater interest in understanding its effects.  We know why companies do it, 
we just want/need to understand what happens as a result.  The International Monetary 
Fund wrote a paper in 2015 outlining how tax base spillovers affect economies around 
the world, including, but not limited to developing countries.  The one exception to this 
being the inclusion of what effects it has on African countries, as a well as a predictive 
aspect.  Africa is a large population base on its way to greater levels of development.  
Seeing as the West has long seen the effects of corporate tax avoidance and begun to 
understand them, it makes good political and economic sense to not only share the 
knowledge, but construct models in order to further understand it in a newly developing 
region. 
 Tax base spillover is when the tax revenue falls over a given period of time as a 
result of profit shifting by large corporations.  As Africa has only recently become home 
to multinational corporations, like Coke, Pfizer, and Volkswagen tax base spillover as 
defined was not possible.  Now, that such companies have come to Africa and been on 
the continent long enough for valuable information to be collected, comparative analysis 
of both pre and post multi-nation fiscal years is possible.  There are challenges to this 
novel analysis that have appeared as the field has developed. 
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 Africa is a continent composed of mostly third and developing world countries, 
with some exceptions like South Africa.  Most of the countries in Africa spent the 
majority of the 20th century under the colonial rule of some European nation like England 
or France.  History has shown these relationships to be deleterious to the colony in favor 
of benefiting the colonizer with whatever resources they can extract from the African 
country.  In the wake of this parasitic relationship, when the colonizing power either 
leaves gracefully, or is expelled from the country by a revolution of some kind, the 
country is often left in a venerable state.  Such states of venerability include a lack of 
structured government.  With the departure of a ruling colonial power, the bureaucracy 
they created, and the people they sent to run it depart too.  This forces the people native 
to the country to try and fill the personnel needs of that government when they may not 
be able to due to their systemic exclusion from such roles.  As a result, there is a strong 
possibility for mismanagement of country resources, the invasion of another country to 
set up a pseudo-government which benefits them, or a forced regime change.  All of these 
only worsen the likelihood and effects of BEPS and tax base spillover. 
 This venerable state typically leads to two outcomes, the first being a corrupt 
government, typically a dictatorship of some kind, the second an unstable democratic 
system, prone to collapse or replacement by coup at the hands of another entity.  These 
other entities, whether they are internal or external, believe they have a greater perception 
of what the country and population at large want out of their newly independent country.  
What these two outcomes have in common is they lead to a similar level of disorder and 
lack of governmental productivity.  This, in turn, allows for corruption to gain an even 
firmer hold on the fledgling country.  Once these infrastructures of corruption have settled 
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within the government of any country, both developed and not, the energy required to 
remove it is vast.  This amount of energy, both by man and technology is rarely available 
in fledgling countries, so the corruption goes unchecked once it has established itself.  
This leads to many negative externalities for both the government, and the people of the 
country, one of them being widespread tax avoidance and fraud. 
 Both tax avoidance and fraud are methods of not paying one’s share of taxes, with 
the former being a legal means of doing so, and the latter being illegal.  Base erosion and 
profit shifting (BEPS) the namesake of this paper is a form of legal tax avoidance which 
large multi-national corporations perform in order to minimize their tax liability in any 
given year, in any given country they do business in.  Many large companies look to the 
fledgling and unstable countries in Africa to establish satellites of their already highly 
developed and profitable companies that are suffering from high corporate tax rates (CIT) 
in developed nations.  These developed multi-national firms capitalize on the lack of 
established government or tax infrastructure, and the willingness of these fledgling 
countries to welcome such established firms into their countries and economies in the 
hopes that they will bring prosperity, in an effort to minimize their own tax liability on a 
global scale. 
 Beyond the fact that these large multi-national corporations are supporting 
sometimes corrupt or poorly constructed governments with their presence in the country, 
they are also draining tax revenue from governments around the world.  This is one of the 
main consequences of BEPS.  The revenue which should have been generated and taxed 
in Country A by Multi-National A is lost because that company has shifted profits to 
Country B.  Whether Multi-National A has done this by deceptive accounting practices 
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or moving operations to Country B, the potential amount of tax revenue that could have 
been generated has been eroded, hence the name.  With Country B not having as great a 
CIT as Country A, if a CIT of any sort, Country B too has lost out on potential tax revenue.   
 This is where the importance for such an analysis and study of the effects of BEPS 
has on developing countries.  However, given the unpredictable nature of such countries, 
as well as the quality of the information that is able to be extracted from them, information 
from all countries will be utilized in order to add validity to a comparative analysis.  
Although emphasis will be placed on the results found on African countries, developed 
countries, like the United States, Germany, France will be included in the data.  Utilizing 
these it was found that there is no significant link between increased corruption in African 
countries and increased tax base erosion.  It was found that as a country becomes more 
fragile, in other words, less stable that tax base erosion does increase.  This is in the same 
vein as a nation which sees increased corruption, so this finding is still linked to the 
objective of the thesis. 
 These results and how they were attained will be outlined in this thesis in the 
following manner.  Section 2 will cover a brief historic background of base erosion and 
profit shifting to increase understanding on this esoteric topic.  Section 3 covers the 
literature reviewed for this topic, the first part concerning base erosion, the second 
concerning profit shifting.  Section 4 discusses the data collected for the econometric 
model, as well as the models used to generate the regression analysis.  This includes an 
estimation model along with the novel model which this thesis created.  This section also 
includes the descriptive table and graph which will further describe the results.  Section 
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5 pertains to the regression models and their analysis.  Section 6 discusses what 
conclusions were drawn from the analysis, and this is followed by the bibliography. 
 
 
II. Historical Context of Base Erosion, Profit Shifting, and the Role of Tax 
Avoidance in the Modern Multinational Company 
 As stated previously, base erosion and profit shift is just another manifestation of 
corporate tax avoidance.  Profit shifting being the monetary transaction which lowers a 
company’s tax burden in the country they are legal residing in, and base erosion being 
the effect profit shifting has on that same country’s tax revenue, or its tax base.   The 
reason BEPS has become such an increasingly popular topic of discussion in the world 
of economics is due to the rise of the multinational, high profit company.  Over the past 
fifty years a number of companies have either transitioned or been created to cater to the 
global market, companies like Walmart, Amazon, and Apple.  This has opened the door 
to firm profit shifting on a much larger scale, both in terms of the number of companies 
participating in the practice, as well as the sheer amount of capital they are moving 
abroad.  If a company is not capable of shifting its profit from its parent company in its 
home country to another entity of the company in another country, this form of tax 
avoidance is not legally possible.  That is not to say companies have not illegally shifted 
profit our of their home country, but that is no longer tax avoidance, but tax evasion which 
unlike the former is an illegal means of not paying your due share of tax. 
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 Along with the increased feasibility of profit shifting due to an increase in the 
globalization of companies, there has also been a trend towards greater and greater 
revenue and profits in companies the world over.  Although companies have always held 
generating higher revenue and profit as goals, following long periods of economic 
stagnation and recession during the 1970s, there was a collective desire to pursue to 
simply make more money in the West.  This combined with an ideological shift in 
mainstream politics in countries like the United States and the United Kingdom, which 
came as a result of the poor economic state they faced in the 1970s, prioritized market 
freedom over government control.  What came of this was lowered corporate tax rates 
and removing regulations typically imposed on large companies, like penalties imposed 
on those who shift profit overseas, to name one.   
 Prior to this historic deregulation tax avoidance was the job of company 
accountants to make prudent suggestions to executives to apply revenue to projects that 
benefited most from tax law within the country they operated in.  Now, in an age without 
metaphorical borders, they could simply move their firm’s money to a foreign country 
with a more favorable tax rate.  From this, a new profit maximizing corporate culture had 
been established.  There was no reason for a country to keep their money in their own 
country.  This led to a loss in potential tax revenue for countries all over the world, but 
because the companies were still making more profit and revenue than they were before 
the new era of deregulation, it went mostly unnoticed.  This produces the dilemma to 
those integral bodies trying to reduce profit shifting in an effort to minimize base erosion.  
By reducing the former, they may have minimized the latter, but subsequently, the former 
did not grow to its potential.  This is the reason, and in no small part, that government 
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intervention in order to prevent the practice of profit shifting did not occur until it posed 
an economic threat.  This is where we find the global economic climate in the 21st century, 
and why the interest in understanding and curbing its spread has reached the new heights 
we see today. 
  
 
III. Literature Review 
 Literature Discussing Base Erosion 
  The 2015 IMF funded analysis of how base erosion and profit shifting, although 
taking place across the globe has a greater impact on developing countries.  These 
countries are those that have the weakest economies, most affected by economic shocks, 
like a dramatic shift of profits and thus tax revenue from one country to another.  The 
paper by Crivelli et. al (2015) lays the foundation for how further analysis of base erosion 
is measured.  They did so in two ways, measuring base spillover and strategic spillover.  
The former is the dollar measurement of how much Country A loses in tax revenue 
because of its own corporate tax policies.  The latter is the measurement of how much tax 
revenue Country A loses because of the more alluring tax policies of Country B which 
drive business out of Country A.  A complex topic, with a great deal of nuance involved 
in it and the equations used to calculate its derivation, it adds a scientific means of 
calculating such an esoteric figure.  
 Along with the two methods in which BEPS are defined and calculated, Crivelli 
et. al (2015) discusses what international events typically occur prior to a company 
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deciding to commit to an internal tax policy of profit shifting.  Typically, there needs to 
be an oppressive rate of corporate tax in their primary country of business, as well as 
preferential tax relations with another country.  These preferential relations are typically 
created by tax treaties.  Such documents allow for companies in notoriously high 
corporate tax countries to find shelter from the high rates in neighboring countries with 
the approval of their own country.  Popular tax haven countries include the Netherlands 
and Ireland, where in some cases companies pay no tax on their profits earned in such 
countries. 
 Through both of these methods of tax avoidance, sanctioned or not by one 
government or another, they still fuel the problem of base erosion and ultimate loss of tax 
revenue by countries that desperately need the income.  Compounding this problem is the 
observed trend that as a developing country becomes more like first world nations, they 
lose tax revenue, beyond the effects of base erosion and profit shifting. (Aizeman and 
Jinjarak 2007) Globalization has many advantages for the developing world, but it also 
has its drawbacks.  For example, when a country does get its first multi-national 
corporation, starts creating infrastructure, and developing its economy to compete in the 
new world, it must also rely on harder to collect taxes.  These are taxes like personal and 
corporate income taxes which require their own governmental agencies in order to collect 
them efficiently and effectively.  This requires money, which the developing nations 
already don’t have, so they are forced further behind for the simple reason they didn’t 
develop during the first wave of industrialization, usually at no fault of their own.  Instead 
of these hard to collect taxes, they rely on easy to collect taxes like tariffs which can be 
collected immediate at points of entry, no extra governmental oversight required.  What 
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all this equates to is a growing economy with less revenue than it had before it had started 
developing in the first place.  This is a plight which effects developing nations across the 
globe. 
Literature Discussing Profit Shifting 
 Profit shifting by large international firms both in the United States and abroad 
has been common place since late 20th century.  In an era where profit maximization and 
tax liability minimization is the primary goal for financial officers, such a relatively easy, 
although deceitful practice makes sense (Keightley and Stupack 2015).  In reality, these 
actions may seem beneficial to companies in the short run, have the ability to damage 
them permanently in the long run.  As a result of their actions in avoiding tax payments 
to whatever countries their company resides, that country may deem it necessary to raise 
taxes at home, or penalize companies that chose to shift profits abroad.  This results in a 
higher tax liability ten years down the road that eliminates whatever gains the company 
had made in the past ten with the tax avoidance practices.  The Organization for Economic 
Co-Operation Development has made it a priority of theirs to minimize these unintended 
consequences by creating charter plans to reel in both companies and the most reactive 
countries to ensure economic stability, despite the increase in profit shifting as of late. 
 Corruption also plays a significant role in profit shifting and tax avoidance, not to 
mention tax fraud in both developed and developing countries explains Bilicka and Seidel 
(2020).  With an increase in corruption within a given company will lead to increases in 
profit shifting.  This corruption can range from personal goals of embezzling or company 
goals of minimizing tax liability leading to more radical and sometimes illegal internal 
tax policy.  Regardless of the motive, or to what scale it manifests, such corruption affects 
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entire countries because of the lost tax revenue this corruption creates.  There is also the 
possibility that the government itself is corrupt, with civil servants and other bureaucrats 
committing illegal acts against the state for their own interests.  When corruption is as 
pervasive as this, and it does not discriminate between developed and non-developed 
countries, governmental oversight, as well as tax system reform has little effect as the 
problem has exceeded the reach of law and order.  As a result, the corruption become 
institutionalized and all parties involved, especially those who must rely on the efficacy 
of government most heavily, suffer heavily. 
  The gap in the information on these two subjects, and where this thesis seeks to 
fill said gap is specifically how this economic phenomenon affects African countries.  The 
working paper published by the IMF does an excellent job laying a framework from 
which to build on, but their categorization of countries is broad in scope.  For example, 
they group a country like the Russian Federation with Rwanda, and then compare it to a 
group including the United States and the Bahamas.  Not that we are casting stones at the 
IMF and its reasoning or methods, it is just apparent that a shifting of categories, like 
focusing on just Africa compared to the rest of the world would produce meaningful 












IV. Data and Econometric Model 
 This section has the purpose of describing the data used for the model estimation.  
There are six sources of data for the nine variables, although both Africa Dummy and 
OECD Dummy do not require data.  Given the multiple databases this thesis and analysis 
requires, there is the situation that the number of observations varies by spreadsheet.  In 
order to maximize accuracy while still maintaining some diversity in information, the 
number of observations was reduced from in excess of 6,000 to 4,324.   The sources of 
those observations are as follows.   
 The corruption variable data was drawn from the Corruption Perception Index1 or 
CPI as it will be referred to for the duration of this paper.  A creation of Transparency 
International, a global organization with the goal ending corruption around the world, the 
index is a composite of multiple factors used to generate a single figure.  Although these 
factors vary from country to country, as well as from year to year, they produce a value 
the organization deems accurate in terms of what it is trying to describe.  The database 
spans twenty-five years, from 1995 to 2020.  The organization changed its methodology 





country along with its CPI score this fault in the data was a solvable issue.   Along with 
the inconsistency in methodology there was also an inconsistency in the number of 
countries included over the years the index has been published.  During the first year of 
the index, only 41 countries were included in its analysis of corruption.  While this 
number steadily grew to 180 by the year 2020, it waivered from year to year.  For the 
years and countries that are blank, predictions were made for the CPI value, based on 
values which related to bother the year and country they represented. 
 The GDP variable draws its data from the World Bank database2.  This was the 
most complete set of data included in the model, having contained information spanning 
from 1990 to 2020.  This was the original time frame set at the beginning of the thesis, 
but due to the restrictions posed by other datasets, it was reduced to 1995 to 2018.  
Regardless, it is collective GDP database that is used as the base from which other 
databases and information will be added to.  Additionally, the countries that are included 
by the World Bank in this, and all of their datasets, will be the benchmark for the list of 
countries that will be included in the analysis.  Some of the other datasets include 
countries or territories, but these are dropped to ensure cohesive analysis of the combined 
data.  which any country will be included from other databases. 
 Import and export data is drawn from the OECD database3 for international trade 
based on firm size.  The size of firms utilized for this draw on the data are those companies 
who have an excess of 250 employees.  This is to simulate the revenue generated by large 






firms this analysis is supposed to integrate.  The pitfall which presents itself for the 
collection of the data this set provides is the inconsistency of years between it and the 
master GDP file from which all entries are merged on to. 
 Furthermore, the personal income tax rate, or PIT, as it will be referred to from 
here on out comes from Our World in Data4, a venture of the University of Oxford in the 
United Kingdom.  Admittedly, this is a highly specific origin of the data, but given the 
nature of taxation rates, and how they are measured as a percentage of the total revenue 
any country i generates, they are inconsequential to the tax base spillover estimation.  
Beyond the crucial nature to country specific PIT rate, the same peculiar and highly 
specific nature of these figures also creates credibility.  Oxford University is a known the 
world over as a highly prestigious institution, specializing in the pursuit of novel research, 
as such the figures they associate their name with are no doubt representative of the aspect 
of the economy they are trying to represent.  This dataset, like that reporting the GDP of 
each country for each year of interest for the study, is descriptive for all the years initially 
proposed to be included in the analysis, 1990-2020.  However, like the GDP based data, 
the years included in the survey needed to be abridged to accommodate the less 
comprehensive datasets.   
 The information relating to corporate income tax, or CIT, which is crucial in 
estimating the tax base spillover rate per country per year comes from the Tax 
Foundation5, the premier non-profit organization dealing with taxation both in the United 






all the data collectively, as it is from this data that we draw one of the base level figures 
for the tax base spillover estimation, but also the summation of the relevant CIT rates 
required, as well as the weighted average which is added to the end of the estimation.  
Although it comes from a different source than the PIT data, the Tax Foundation versus 
Oxford, they share plenty of similarities.  These similarities, beyond the obvious factors 
like the countries both databases chose to include, include the means in which they came 
to the tax figures for each year.  Although both databases concerning PIT and CIT 
information present only one tax rate, federal taxation systems all over the world have 
multiple tiers.  Thankfully, the manner in which both datasets calculate the singular 
taxation rate they provide for every year each country is represented are identical.  This 
generated 5518 observations for CIT, but as with all of the datasets save the GDP 
database, this number had to be reduced to 4,324 observations in order to align with the 
least comprehensive data. 
 Finally, the fragility index from which the variable of the same name is derived is 
a product of the Fragile States Index6.  This index uses indicators from multiple sectors 
of their 178-country sample base like economic factors, as well as both political and social 
indicators to generate a value which effectively portrays the degree to which a given 
country is perceived in terms of its strength and cohesiveness, or lack thereof.  This 
dataset is one of the least comprehensive.  Having only begun in 2006, the fragile states 
index not only has far fewer observations than the other datasets used in this analysis, it 
also has altered its methods of producing a fragility index score over time.  This is to be 





Afterall, they are attempting to give a fixed value of measurement to a quality which is 
constantly in flux. 
• Tax base spillover estimation model 
𝑏𝒊𝒕 = 𝜆𝑏𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜑𝜏𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑾−𝒊𝝉−𝒊𝒕 + 𝜻 ′𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
where i equals a given country and t equals a given year 
•  𝑏𝒊𝒕 – tax base spillover estimation for country i and year t 
• 𝜆𝑏𝑖𝑡−1 – percent change in tax base spillover from year t-1  
• 𝜑𝜏𝑖𝑡 – weighted CIT for country i and year t 
• 𝑾−𝒊𝝉−𝒊𝒕 – weighted summation of tax rates in all countries except i 
• 𝜻 ′𝑿𝒊𝒕 – vector for controls relating to country and year specific fixed effects for 
country i and year t 
• 𝛼𝑖 – error for country i 
• 𝜇𝑡 – error for year t 
• 𝜀𝑖𝑡 – error for country i given year t 
 The estimation of tax base spillover for a given country during a specified year, 
shown as 𝑏𝒊𝒕 is a rather complex summation of variables.  The first variable (𝜆𝑏𝑖𝑡−1) is 
equivalent to the percent change in tax base spillover calculated from the previous year, 
which in of itself is a cumulative value from the years which proceeded that particular 
year.  The following variable (𝜑𝜏𝑖𝑡) is the simply weighted corporate income tax rate.  
This CIT is specified in the econometric model for the given country and year in 
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question.  The next value (𝑾−𝒊𝝉−𝒊𝒕) is this averaged summation figure.  This value 
takes the summation of all corporate income tax rates for a given year then subtracts the 
country in question (referred to as i) and then multiplies that figure by a GDP multiplier.  
This GDP multiplier referenced has been calculated by the Tax Foundation, a trusted 
source and reference for this thesis.  Finally, there is 𝜻 ′𝑿𝒊𝒕 which controls for country 
specific factors needed to produce effective results.  These include population size and 
GDP percentages related to different sectors of a nation’s economy.  They are needed to 
create a sense of validity from the dataset as some variables fall short to compare to 
others, both in terms of country and year.  Combined with the country, year, and 
country given year error variables they produce the tax base spillover value of the 
regression and its derivatives. 
• Novel Econometric Model 
Tax Base Spillover = β0 + β1(Corruption)it + β2(Imports)it + β3(OECD Dummy)it + 
β4(GDP)it + β5(PIT)it + β6(PIT)it + β7(Africa Dummy)it + β8(Fragility)it + β9(Exports)it + 
εit 
• Corruption – value taken from Corruption Perception Index; scored out of 100, 
100 being the mark of a corruption free nation.  This figure is generated by 
Transparency International, an international organization with a mission to 
eliminate corruption around the world. 




• OECD Dummy – dummy variable denoting whether or not the country is a part 
of the OECD. 
• GDP (in billions) – the size of the country’s gross domestic product. 
• Personal Income Tax Rate (PIT) - the average rate for individuals on which their 
income is taxed. 
• Corporate Income Tax Rate (CIT) - the average rate for corporations on which 
their income is taxed. 
• Africa Dummy – dummy variable denoting whether a country is in Africa. 
• Fragility - how fragile a nation is from either revolting against its sitting 
government, or that government collapsing under its own incompetence.   
• Exports - amount of revenue generated on services sold by firms over 250 
employees in size. 
The methodology used for this thesis is country level panel data regressions with 
fixed effects for country and year.  The limitation for the econometric model is the fact 
that it is based on an estimation.  This estimation, although accounting for many 
possible hidden variables, is still an approximation of the value this thesis is based on.  
As for the data, the limitations stem from the inconsistency between datasets.  Sets like 
the fragility and corruption indexes did not encompass all the years datasets like those 
pertaining to GDP or CIT.  This came from either the index changing how their values 
were generated or reported, or they simply didn’t exist prior to a certain year.  There 
also was the issue of differing data collection methodology between the reporters of 
CIT and PIT, the Tax Institute versus Oxford, respectively.  The solution to these data 
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based problems would be to either reduce the number of years included in the data, or to 





 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N mean sd min max 
      
Corruption 4,324 42.41 19.37 8 92 
Service Imports 3,710 20,406 53,577 9.757 588,363 
Service Exports 3,710 21,157 61,694 3.425 875,830 
Fragility 2,389 70.40 23.83 16.80 114.9 
PIT_rate 4,324 2.570 3.742 0 26.23 
GDP 4,324 38.38 137.7 0 1,398 
CIT_rate 4,324 0.229 0.134 0 0.600 
Tax Base Spillover 4,324 349.7 1,329 0 18,177 
      







V. Regression Results 
 The section will serve to interpret the presented results of four different 
regressions which vary in scope based on their controls, and subsequently the data the 
draw upon.  For the sake of consistency, those models labeled one and two (located 
directly below) will be referred to as the “Preliminary Regression Results”.  The first 
model included in this output provides the baseline model which includes only the two 
true independent variables of interest, in terms of the topic of the thesis, those variables 
being corruption and corporate income tax rate.  The second model pertains to the 
subgroup of the data collected that too emphasizes the purpose of this paper, the countries 























































































































































Preliminary Regression Results 
Table 3 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Total Spillover African Country Spillover 
   
Corruption -0.0649 0.492 
 (3.659) (0.683) 
GDP  2.279* 
  (1.338) 
Corporate Tax Rate -248.6*** 6.003 
 (92.42) (6.045) 
Personal Tax Rate  -1.185** 
  (0.538) 
Service Imports  0.00361*** 
  (0.00108) 
Service Exports  0.00267** 
  (0.00121) 
Corruption x GDP  -0.00176 
(0.0450) 
Constant 299.6** -33.40 
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 (147.9) (21.09) 
   
Observations 4,324 1,066 
R-squared 0.059 0.829 
Number of country_id 173 51 
Country FE YES YES 
Year FE YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 From the first model in the preliminary regression results, we observe that when 
looked through the lens of all of the countries and years from the entire dataset, corruption 
does not have a significant effect on the dependent variable, spillover.  We do see that 
corporate income tax rate (CIT) has a significant and negative relationship with tax base 
spillover.  This relationship represents a point increase in a country’s CIT for a given year 
decreasing the amount of tax base spillover that country encounters by 248.6 million 
USD.  This large quantity decrease seems counterintuitive to the notion of tax base 
spillover, described in the data section above.  However, because the measurement of tax 
base spillover is tailored towards developed nations with larger value CIT rates, this 
makes sense.  Also, this may be linked as to why CIT holds such significance and 
corruption does not.  On a similar vein, the lack of significance seen in the corruption 
variable can also be explained by a collinearity between tax base spillover and CIT, as a 
CIT estimation is used in the tax base spillover calculation. 
 The model which follows this rudimentary model is that which includes all of the 
control variables described in the data section.  The regression does not, in fact, include 
all of the data which the set used for the first model, but on the data which is linked to a 
country in the continent of Africa.  Once again, like the model before it, corruption is not 
significant in this model.  Although, unlike the first model, GDP is significant at a 10% 
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significance level.  For every increase in one-million USD in an African country’s GDP 
sees a rise in 2.28 million USD of tax base spillover.  Another contrasting variable to the 
first model is the personal income tax rate (PIT) has significance, but the CIT no longer 
does.  Much like the relationship the PIT had to tax base spillover, in this model, a one 
point increase in the PIT rate for a given country in Africa results in a 1.185 unit decrease 
in tax base spillover seen.  Following this significant variable are those which relate to 
the imports and exports of services from a given country.  As framed in the data section, 
a one-million USD increase in service imports results in a 0.00361 unit increase tax base 
spillover, while a one-million USD increase in service exports results in a 0.00267 unit 





Complimentary Regression Results 
Table 3 
 (3) (4) 
VARIABLES OECD Country Spillover Fragile Nations Spillover 
   
Corruption -17.04** -2.427* 
 (8.271) (1.356) 
GDP 26.03 20.17*** 
 (21.35) (6.626) 
Corporate Tax Rate -226.9 15.31 
 (250.1) (26.87) 
Personal Tax Rate -6.297 0.0250 
 (6.813) (1.714) 
Service Imports 0.000930 0.00622* 
 (0.00206) (0.00329) 
Service Exports 0.00303* 0.00155 
 (0.00162) (0.00282) 
Corruption x GDP 0.503** 0.0155 
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 (0.206) (0.0496) 
Fragility  1.770 
  (1.317) 
Fragility x GDP   -0.125** 
  (0.0488) 
Constant 176.5 -252.0* 
 (775.8) (146.7) 
   
Observations 887 2,170 
R-squared 0.890 0.811 
Number of country_id 37 163 
Country FE YES YES 
Year FE YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 These next two models, which we will call the complimentary regression models, 
illustrate other observations seen by the data.  This is in an effort to add context to the 
first two regressions which stemmed from the novel concepts this thesis brought to the 
analysis of base erosion and profit shifting, and their subsequent effects on a given 
country.  As such, in the third model, designed to analyze the effects of corruption and 
fragility on OECD member nations, we see the following trends.  As a note, it is 
understood that the nations in this group of countries are typically developed, so this 
model is used to contrast the information derived from the solely African nations data. 
In this third model we see that corruption has a negative and significant effect on 
tax base spillover.  This is seen with a one unit increase in corruption in other nations 
leads to a 17.04 unit decrease in overall tax base spillover in the country in question.  This 
is to be expected as an increase in corruption in other developed nations will result in 
those nations which are not included to have business flock to their shores.  This results 
in a greater tax base, less profit shifting out of the country, and in turn less tax base 
spillover.  We see next that it is the exports of services which is the next significant 
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variable, with a one-million USD increase in service exports results in a 0.00303 unit 
increase in tax base spillover.  This is understandable as these service exports are directly 
linked to large multinational corporations, so in essence a portion of these exports are part 
of profit shifting practices.  Finally, the interaction variable between GDP and corruption 
has a positive and significant relationship with tax base spillover.  The relationship seen 
is that for every single unit increase in corruption of other nations, but the one-million 
USD increase in the nation in question, increases by 0.503 million USD of tax base 
spillover.  This alludes to the fact that GDP affects corruption within a nation, causing it 
to increase as the wealth of a nation increases. 
 The final model, which pertains to the countries and years from which the Fragile 
States Index had data on, all told it was a loss of only ten country IDs when compared to 
the list of countries the Total Spillover model drew upon, that number being 173.  First, 
we note that corruption is once again negative and significant in its relationship to tax 
base spillover, although not at as great a magnitude as it was seen in the OECD model.  
This effect is measured by an increase in one unit of corruption leading to 2.427 unit 
decrease in tax base spillover for the same reason it was seen in the OECD countries, just 
for the large scope of nations.  Next, we see the significant and positive impact GDP has 
on tax base spillover, increasing by 20.17 million USD of tax base spillover for every 
one-million USD increase in a nations GDP.  This makes reasonable sense as a nation 
with a greater GDP is more likely to have higher CIT, which would lead large 
corporations to find cheaper places to declare their profits.  Service imports are a positive 
and significant relationship with tax base spillover as well.  Relating to a one-million 
USD in imports increase to a 0.00622 unit increase in tax base spillover.  Although it is 
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not a large effect on tax base spillover, like that compared to GDP which is measured in 
the same units of million USD, it still has an impact on increasing it.  Finally, we have 
the relationship that the interaction between the GDP and the fragility of a country have 
on tax base spillover.  This relationship is seen to be negative and significant, resulting in 
a decrease of 0.125 million USD of tax base spillover for every one-million USD 
multiplied by one fragility unit increase in the interaction.  This leads one to see that a 
poorer nation, as well as a more fragile one results in more tax base spillover seen by that 
nation.  Such nations will no doubt seem troublesome to investors, both home and abroad, 





 Ultimately, a relationship between increased corruption and increased tax base 
spillover can be seen from this data.  Unfortunately, this relationship cannot be seen 
directly in the data which was specifically intended for this conclusion to be drawn, that 
being African countries.  It can be seen in more fragile nations, but this sub-category of 
countries cannot be directly linked to the continent in question.  Tax base spillover has a 
great link to fluctuations in PIT and CIT, although these two variables are not significant 
collectively.  Furthermore, the amount of service imports and exports by large companies 
within a particular nation serve a significant relation to tax base spillover.  For both of 
them to have a link to base spillover’s reduction as their values increase is an observation 
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unexpected, given their directly opposite nature on perceived effect on a nations 
economy.  On a slightly more concrete note of productive conclusions would be the link 
between fragility and tax base spillover.  It is seen from the last model analyzed in this 
paper that a fragile nation, especially one that has a smaller GDP, is more likely to 
experience tax base spillover. 
 Reflecting on this process, I would certainly have revised some of the steps that 
were taken to reach this final product.  Chief among which would be to find a more easily 
calculated estimation for tax base spillover by country.  As insightful as the IMF paper 
was for this paper, its lack of data directly linking the estimation model, the values it 
produced, and the countries in which those values came from made this paper’s own 
estimation difficult to generate, as well as lacking in validity.  Another alteration I would 
make is waiting for all of the data sources which were incorporated into this thesis to all 
possess thirty years of data, the number which was planned from the beginning.  Due to 
either restructuring of how datasets were calculated, or the fact that datasets did not exist 
the first year of the data proved to generate holes in the set which are believed to have 
produced the lacking results.  This, however, is an uncertain assumption.  
 Africa still must become a higher priority for the economic community.  The pool 
of people which remain a lacking part of the global economic equation, especially in a 
predictive aspect is too great if we wish to continue building a cohesive understanding of 
the future of all the world’s countries.  The effects of BEPS remain a shifting 
understanding even in the developed world, where information is plentiful, and analysis 
are constantly happening.  I believe it is a necessity that more comprehensive questions, 
questions like those asked in this paper, need to come from those bodies like the World 
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Bank, IMF, and United Nations that have the resources to effectively change the course 
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